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A MID a field of law of peculiar interest to the student be-
cause of its confusion both of history and of policy -that
of covenants running with the land- the subject of party wall
covenants seems especially attractive. Here we have a form of
covenant which has appealed to most courts as a sensible and
desirable arrangement for the use and development of realty.
Yet current legal theory is against the validity of such an agree-
ment as a running covenant, passing with the conveyance of
the land. ' As might be expected, the courts tend to follow their
natural instincts, such covenants are being more and more gener-
ally upheld, and legal theory is left to stew in the difficulties of
its own concocting.2 It is proposed herein to reexamine the
problem, with a view of testing the soundness of such legal
theory and of determining whether current judicial practice does
violate the policy of applicable and analogous legal rules. The
cases on the subject were carefully collected and analyzed some
years ago by Profegsor Ralph W. Aigler in a learned and excel-
lent article,3 and hence we need not repeat that task but may
confine ourselves to a consideration of the principles thought to
underlie the problem.
To understand the difficulties of legal theory herein involved,
we ought first to remember the generally recognized essentials
of a real or running covenant. In order that a covenant may
"run with the land," to use the well-known metaphorical expres-
sion signifying the transfer of the covenant rights or duties with
the transfer of the land to which the covenant relates, there must
be (i) observance of the formalities requisite to the making of
a technical covenant or promise under seal; (2) an intention
1 See 2 TinsANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2 ed., 1262, 1263. See Ralph W. Aigler,
"The Running with the Land of Agreements to Pay for a Portion of the Cost
of Party-Walls," io M IcH. L. Rv. 187. And see 8 CoL. L. Rlv. 121 (arguing
that all such covenants must be held personal); 4 CoL. L. REv. 441; 1 COL.
L. Rav. 257.
2 Cases are cited in the notes following and also in the authorities given in
note i. For interesting remarks as to the divergence of theory from common
sense in this connection, see McCormick v. Stoneheart, 195 S. W. 883 (Tex.,
1917). 3 See note i, supra.
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of the parties that the covenant should so run; (3) a promise
of such kind that it may be held "to touch or concern the
land; " and (4) "privity of estate."'
The first two requirements need not here be discussed, since.
their general nature is probably apparent.5 The third is de-
signed to establish some degree of connection between the cov-
enant and certain realty, and it necessitates, as a scientific method
of test, the measuring of the legal relations of the parties with
and without the covenant. If the promisor's legal relations, in
connection with the land in question, and not merely as' an
individual, are lessened or materially modified, the burden
"touches or concerns" the land; if the promisee's legal rela-
tions of like kind are increased or materially modified, the
benefit "touches or concerns" the land. The suggested test
was first developed by Professor H. A. Bigelow in a valuable
article, to which the reader is referred for a complete discus-
sion of the complex problem caused by the application of this
requirement.6 Perhaps two examples may serve, however, to
indicate the method. An agreement by a lessee to leave part
of the leased land unploughed each year satisfies the test as
to both benefit and burden, for it lessens the privileges of user
which would otherwise have been the lessee's by virtue of his
lease, while it gives a right which benefits the lessor in his rever-
sion in the land by securing a crop rotation.' But a covenant
by the lessee to pay taxes for the lessor on other than the leased
land imposes a duty upon the lessee unconnected with the
leased premises, and grants a right to the lessor which is not
for his benefit as reversioner, and hence the test is not satisfied.'
4 See Charles E. Clark, "The Doctrine of Privity of Estate in Connection
with Real Covenants," 32 YALE L. J. 123.
5 As to how far mere acceptance of a deed poll may be treated as a covenant
see 2 TEmANY, op. cit, 1402; SIMS, COVENANTS OTER THAN COVENATS POR
TITLE, 188-i95. That the use of the word "assigns" is not an absolute essential
in order that a covenant may run, see authorities given in the writer's article
previously cited, 32 YALE L. J. 123, 124, nn. 7, 8.
6 See Harry A. Bigelow, "The Content of Covenants in Leases," 12 MICH.
L. REv. 639, 30 LAW Q. REv. 319. See also note by Aigler, I7 Mica L. REV. 93.
7 Cockson v. Cock, Cro. Jac. 125 (16o6); Chapman v. Smith, [,907] 2 Ch.
97. See 7 COL. L. REv. 627.
8 Gower v. Postmaster-General, 57 L. T. R. (N. S.) 527 (1887). See Charles
E. Clark, supra, 125, 126. See also note 13, infra.
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The requirement of privity of estate has caused much diffi-
culty. The writer has recently had occasion to consider the
problem in detail and hence will state here only the conclusions
he has previously reached.' This essential has been variously
viewed as stating three quite dissimilar requirements: (a)
succession to the estate in the land of one of the parties to the
covenant; (b) succession of estate also between the parties to
the covenant at the time of its making; and (c) the doctrine
originating in Massachusetts, sometimes termed the Massachu-
setts doctrine of "substituted privity "- mutual and simulta-
neous interests of both parties to the covenant in the land, out-
side of the covenant and at the time of its making. If C wishes
to enforce against D a covenant made to A, his predecessor in
- the ownership of Blackacre, by B, D's predecessor in the owner-
ship of Whiteacre, there is sufficient privity of estate under (a)
by the mere succession of interest of C to A and B to D; but
under (b) there must also have been a conveyance of a realty
interest between A and B at the time the covenant was made;
and under (c) A and B at the same time must each have had
a recognizable legal interest in either one of the two pieces of
land. Theory (b) has no justification in either history or prin-
ciple and adds a purely arbitrary requirement. Theory (c)
likewise has no historical justification, and while it may find
some little favor as expressing a policy opposed to incumbrances
on land, it would seem on the whole undesirable. The four
requirements above stated should be sufficient, without the addi-
tion of other arbitrary requirements. This leaves merely (a) as a
complete statement of requirement number 4, with compliance
secured by the mere conveyance of the land, this being the
principle justified both by history and by policy."
9 See Charles E. Clark, supra. See also 21 MIcE. L. REv. 593.
10 Before the statement made by Lord Kenyon in Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R.
393 (i789), without the citation of any authority, that privity of estate is neces-
sary between covenantor and covenantee, there seem to be no precedents for
such a requirement. In fact many old cases are contrary and commentators
have had great difficulty in their attempts to explain them away. E.g., Mr.
Justice Holmes' explanation of Pakenham's Case, Y. B. 42 Edw. II1, 3, pl. 14
(1368). See HOLmES, TnE CoMM oN LAW, 371 et seq. The traditional explanation
is that real covenants have been developed from warranties, and that a convey-
ance was necessary in the case of the ancient implied warranty (which was
abolished as to a conveyance in fee by Quia Emptores in 1290). But the need
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The statement of this requirement in this form really answers
two further questions of some importance in our present prob-
lem. Must there be both a dominant and a servient tenement
in order that a covenant may run? And may the benefit and
the burden of a covenant run separately? Under the Massa-
chusetts doctrine of privity there must be, in practically every
case, a relation of dominancy and serviency. Blackacre must
be held bound to Whiteacre." But such a requirement seems
unjustified, and usually a covenant may run where only one
party to it owns the land involved. This indicates the answer
to our other question, for this means that the benefit may run
when the burden is in gross, as in the case of the ordinary war-
ranty, and that the burden may run when the benefit is in gross,
as in the case of an obligation to pay a named person for the
use of property. 2 If either burden or benefit may thus run
of the conveyance in the case of the implied warranty was to furnish -the basis
for the implication of a warranty, and where the warranty is express there is
no occasion for requiring a conveyance. See Charles E. Clark, supra, 32 YALE
L. J. 123, 137 et seq. Again, the covenant seems more analogous to the old fine
than to the ancient implied warranty. Many such fines which run with the land
are enforced in the action de fine facto which seems hardly distinguishable from
the action of covenant. The latter action, by 1482, lay to enforce a fine. Bingham
v. Merton, Y. B. 22 Edw. IV, i, pl. 6 (,482). See such cases collected in 32 YALE
L. J. 123, 14o, n. 8o. On principle such an arbitrary requirement has little to com-
mend it. The Massachusetts theory seems to require a preexisting incumbrance
on the land such as an easement. But generally such easement is found where the
promised acts by tht owner of Whiteacre are done for the benefit of Blackacre,
and it is only where one end of the covenant is in gross that the Massachusetts
doctrine becomes effective to strike down the covenant. Where one end is in gross
and hence personal, the life of the covenant is necessarily limited, and the incum-
brance on title small. The desirability of enforcing some covenants of that
kind (see note 12, infra) would seem to outweigh the limited advantages of the
Massachusetts rule in avoiding the running of a few covenants. See 32 YALE
L. . 123, 145.
11 A possible exception is apparently a covenant in aid of an assignable
profit or easement in gross. Query, if the Massachusetts courts would hold such
a profit or easement sufficient to supply the required privity?
12 See 32 YALE L. J. 123, 126-131. Cases where the burden only is in gross
are not unusual. See Nat'l Union Bank at Dover v. Segur, 39 N. J. L. 173 (1877)
(covenant not to compete). Also there is the ordinary covenant of warranty
in a deed, which under the Massachusetts rule must be regarded as a special
exception. Cases where the benefit only is in gross are more rare. A leading
case is a party wall case hereinafter considered. Conduitt v. Ross, 102 Ind. 166,
26 N. E. ig8 (z885). See also Gibson v. Holden, 115 Ii. 199, 3 N. E. 282
(1885). Holmes, J., is contra in Lincoln v. Burrage, 177 Mass. 378, 59 N. E.
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separately when the other is in gross, it should follow that either
should run separately when the other is appurtenant to an
estate in land. This problem is not often discussed, and there
is some authority that both must run or neither can run; but
the better view, it is submitted, is to the contrary. Hence we
must test each end of the covenant separately, to ascertain both
if the parties intended it to run and if it may legally be per-
mitted to do so.'"
Turning now to party wall covenants, we perhaps should
pause to notice the nature of the property interests in such walls.
It has been attempted to restrict the term party wall to a
division or boundary wall between adjoining land owners who
each, therefore, have an interest in the wall.' 4 The normal
situation will be where the wall is erected on the boundary line,
and here by the English rule the parties will be held to own
the wall in common; but in this country they will ordinarily be
held to own, each in severalty, that portion of the wall on his
67 (igoi), hereinafter criticised ("it would be most unusual to have the rights
in gross and the duties appurtenant"), and in Walsh v. Packard, 165 Mass.
I89, 42 N. E. 577 (1896). These cases but carry out, however, the Massachu-
setts view of privity. See note io, supra. See also, contra, 2 CoL. L. Rav. 5S4.
Consol. Arizona Smelting Co. v. Hinchman, 212 Fed. 813 (ist Circ., 1914), is
likewise contra, but not on this express ground. There a covenant by a pur-
chaser of mining property to pay for it in part out of future net earnings
was held not to pass. It is a poorly reasoned case in which the dissenting
judge and the lower court [I98 Fed. 907 (D. Me., 1912)] seem clearly to have
the better of it. Aldrich, J., dissenting, well characterizes some of the current
doctrines of privity of estate when he speaks of the "apparent demonstration"
by counsel "that if the question whether the covenant runs is contingent upon
the existence of a reversionary right, the contingency is not founded upon reason
and if applied to a situation like this, that the denial of a meritorious right
would be based upon grounds, of fiction rather than upon grounds of reason."
See Henry U. Sims, "Notes on Codifying Real Property Law in the United
States," 36 HARv. L. REV. 987, 991, n. 2o: "an interesting example of the con-
fusion of the court over the law." See 13 CoL. L. Rav. z66.
1" This is the basis of Professor Bigelow's criticism of Congleton v. Pattison,
io East, 130 (188), where the lessee agreed to employ in a leased silk mill
only persons complying with specified requirements as to their legal settlements.
Here the lessors were benefited only in respect to the poor rates and not as
reversioners, and hence an assignee of the lessors should not be entitled to sue;
but since the promisor was restricted in his use of the premises, the actual
decision refusing to allow the lessors to sue the assignee of the lessee seems
unsound. See H. A. Bigelow, supra, X2 MIcH. L. REV. 639. See also 32 YALE
L. 1- 23, 126-128.
14 See x R EVEs, REAL PROPERTY, 28S-289.
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side of the liie with a cross-easement of support in his neigh-
bor's portion. 5 A wall entirely on the land of one party will
normally be owned by that party, but of course he may, if
he choose, grant his neighbor an interest therein, such interest
usually taking the form of an easement.'1 The parties often
desire to vary or add to their mutual legal relations respecting
the wall. Such a covenant, for example, might contemplate
ownership of the wall by one party with the renting of an ease-
ment to the other. Or it might merely take the form of a
provision for the mutual repair and upkeep of the wall. 8 Such
covenants are clearly sustainable as running covenants. 9 But
the case which causes difficulty, although it is of frequent occur-
rence, is the covenant by one party to pay in part for a wall
to be built by the other, either on his own land or, more usually,
on land of both, payment to be made not when the wall is built
but only when it is used. We must, therefore, devote our atten-
tion to this situation.
A and B are adjoining landowners. A wishes to build on his
lot and to build to the edge of his lot; B is not yet ready so
to develop his lot. So they make a covenant whereby A gets
the privilege of immediately building a wall one half of which
is to rest on B's premises, and B gets the privilege of building
upon the wall or using it for support of his building whenever
he or his assigns desire to do so, upon paying to A or A's assigns
one half the cost of the wall. Such an arrangement is frequently
resorted to and seems mutually satisfactory to the parties. B
is compelled to pay his share of the cost of the wall only when
he makes beneficial use of it, while A obtains the privilege of
building with a possible chance of future partial reimbursement.
15 Ibid. And see 9 CoL. L. REv. 74.
16 Cf. Knappenberger v. Fairchild, 210 Pa. St. '73, 59 Ad. 986 (I9O4)
(privilege of inserting beams).
17 See Logan v. United Interests, Inc., 236 N. Y. 194, 14o N. E. 240 (1923),
discussed infra.
18 Maupai v. Jackson, X39 App. Div. 524, 124 N. Y. Supp. 220 (1g1o),
affirming 64 Misc. 407, 118 N. Y. Supp. 513 (X909).
19 Whatever doctrine of privity of estate may be applied, it is held that
the required privity exists, since there is both a conveyance of at least an ease-
ment and a covenant in aid of the easement. See Ralph W. Aigler, supra, io
MICH. L. REv. 187. Query, however, where the wall is not yet built. See
note 30, infra.
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What attitude is the law to take towards such an apparently
desirable and amicable arrangement?
The answer must depend,, in the first instance, upon the inten-
tion of the parties. It may be that B will agree to pay at once
and A to build at once. B will then acquire his interest in the
wall as soon as it is built, the covenant will be entirely personal,
and there will be no difficulty as to it. Such course, however,
is rather unusual unless B contemplates immediate use of the
wall. Next, it may be that the parties intend that whoever
owns B's lot and builds on the wall shall owe the obligation but
it shall always be owed to A personally. It is suggested that
actually the parties will rarely so intend, but if they do, there
ought to be no objection to the fulfillment of such intention.
As hereinafter pointed out, such an obligation seems to comply
with the rule that it must touch or concern the land,2" and the
only objection is the one above noted as unsound, namely, that
there is no dominant and servient tenement. Hence the leading
case of Conduitt v. Ross 2 seems clearly sound in upholding
such an arrangement, if, as seems probable, the court has cor-
rectly interpreted the intention of the parties." If the discus-
sion above of the objection here raised has been followed, it
will probably not seem strange that Massachusetts holds to a
contrary doctrine. In an endeavor to restrict the running of
covenants to those not in gross, that court, through Mr. Justice
Holmes in Lincoln v. Burrage,2 refused to uphold a perfectly
reasonable and sensible contract of this character. There the
builder of the wall owned both the lots on which the wall rested,
and at his death his executors sold each piece with a covenant
by each of the grantees and his assigns to pay such executors
one half the cost of the wall upon using it. The decision, re-
20 See discussion infra.
21 102 Ind. 166, 26 N.. E. 198 (r885). See note 12, supra.
22 The language of the original covenant seems to justify this interpretation.
Moreover, the promisee in later assigning the land expressly reserved her interest
in the covenant. There would seem to be no objection to giving effect to such
attempted severance of the covenant from the estate in the land. The one owing
the duty is the only one to object, but he is hardly harmed by the fixing of the
right in a certain person. Cf. Fowler v. Koehler, 43 App. D. C. 349 ((9's). The
rule against severance applied to easements is due to the disfavor with which
easements in gross are regarded. See 20 HARv. L. REv. 136.
23 177 Mass. 378, sg N. E. 67 (igox).
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fusing to enforce such a contract against the assigns of a grantee
on the ground that the right to performance was held in gross,
seems wholly objectionable and shows the unfortunate results
of attempting to enforce an arbitrary requirement of " privity
of estate." 24
The more usual case would seem to be that in which both the
duty to pay and the right to receive payment are intended to
run with the lots of the non-builder and the builder respectively.
In many of the cases this intention is expressed so clearly as to
be beyond doubt. Further, it is submitted that wherever the
contract does not show a contrary intention, the inherent proba-
bilities are in favor of such a purpose. This is, therefore, the
most important case, and it is also the one where legal justifica-
tion of the intended result seems the most difficult.
There seem to have been two theories offered to sustain the
running of such a covenant. According to the first, B, the non-
builder, immediately becomes the owner of his normal interest
in the wall (an interest in severalty in that part on his land
with an easement in the remaining part) but he or his assigns
are subject to a- duty to pay A or his assigns a sum of money -
usually a proportion of the cost or value of the wall-upon
using it. The difficulty here is to discover how the right to re-
ceive a certain sum of money may be held to touch or concern
the land.25 It has even been thought that the burden, the duty
to pay, is also collateral on the ground that a duty to pay money
has no connection with the land, since performance may be
made by any one.26  This seems too narrow a conception. A
duty to pay money in return for a privilege of user of realty
directly concerns the land. It is a burden placed upon the
normal privileges of user, a burden which would not exist except
24 The case is, however, approved by Professor Aigler. See io MicH. L. Rv.
x87. See also i CoL. L. REv. 257; 14 HARv. L. Rxv. 296.
25 There seems to be no objection so far as privity of estate is concerned.
See note ig, supra.
26 See 2 CoL. L. Rav. 554, criticising Jordan v. Indianapolis Water Co., Ig5
Ind. 337, 64 N. E. 68o (1902), stating that rent is an exception and citing Graber
v. Duncan, 79 Ind. 565 (i881), as holding that a covenant to pay taxes does not
run. This case was, however, one by a grantor of real estate to pay current and
back taxes only, and was correct, though not an authority for the general proposi-
tion stated. Cf. also the comments cited in note i, supra.
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for the covenant. Moreover, practically any affirmative obliga-
tion concerning land may be considered, in a certain sense, as
only a burden to pay money, viewed from the promisor's stand-
point, since he may hire an agent to perform for him. Carried
to its logical conclusion, therefore, the argument that a duty to
pay money is necessarily collateral would require the holding
that affirmative covenants in general are collateral-a clearly
untenable position. Hence it is held by the better-reasoned
authorities that an obligation of this kind, of which a duty by a
tenant to pay taxes may perhaps be a not unusual example,
may run. As to the benefit, however, the privilege has, on the
assumed theory, already passed; there is nothing further for
the lot owner, as such, to do; and there remains only a col-
lateral right to receive a sum of money, a right just as valuable
to any one else as to the lot owner. It does not seem possible
to bring such right within any of our ideas of "touching or
concerning," and therefore our whole assumed theory is unable
to bear the strain we wish to put upon it.?8
The second theory assumes that, by the covenant, the builder
acquires the privilege to build a wall which he or his assigns
will own exclusively until the payment is made, and when pay-
ment is made, ownership of one half of the wall and the usual
party wall easements will then pass to the payer. This avoids
the difficulty of touching or concerning, for the only one who
can relinquish the interests contemplated as then passing is, of
course, the then owner of the builder's lot. This seems to be
the theory usually resorted to by writers, and, so far as they
rely on any theory, by the courts also.29 It, too, presents
difficulties.
The first difficulty would seem to be that it assumes an en-
27 Post v. Kearney, 2 N. Y. 394 (1849) (covenant to pay assessments); Gower
v. Postmaster-General, 57 L. T. (N. S.) 527 (1887); Mason v. Smith, 131 Mass.
5IO (i88i); Wills v. Summers, 45 Minn. 90, 47 N. W. 463 (189o). See also
covenants to pay rent, as in Van Rensselaer v. Read, 26 N. Y. 558 (1863). See
2 TIFFANY, op. cit., 1473, 1474.
28 See Ralph W. Aigler, supra, io M Hc. L. REv. 187.
29 Cordill v. Israel, x3o La. 138, 57 So. 778 (1912); McCormick v. Stone-
heart, supra, note 2; Berry v. Godfrey, i98 Mass. 228, 84 N. E. 3o4 (19o8). Cf.
Southworth v. Perring, 71 Kan. 755, 8x Pac. 481, 82 Pac. 785 (go5). See
Ralph W. Aigler, supra, io MIcE. L. Rv. x87.
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tirely unreal intention of the parties. It can hardly be thought
that they really contemplate such a future passing of title.
Possibly, however, we might overlook this objectioi on the
ground that their main intention was to make a valid running
covenant, and that, if necessary to give effect to such intention,
we may ascribe to them such ideas, on points about which they
had had no very definite views, as seem required. The unreality
of the contemplated situation is, however, a drawback.
A second difficulty might be thought to arise under the latter
two versions of the requirement of privity of estate, but since
these are thought to be unsound and since the courts have not
generally felt hampered by them, we may pass this point. 0
The difficulty that no future deed of conveyance is contem-
plated may perhaps be surmounted by saying that the covenant
operates as a contract to convey, and a deed might properly be
demanded if the parties really thought they needed it (which
they apparently do not). The final difficulty is one which the
courts have not discussed but which the text-writers 81 have
thought insurmountable, namely, the Rule against Perpetuities.
It seems now well settled that the Rule applies to option con-
tracts for the conveyance of an interest in land in the indefinite
future. 2 Here there is an agreement giving the non-builder the
option of acquiring a substantial interest in realty in the remote
future. It seems difficult to distinguish this case from other
option contracts held invalid under the rule. Hence this theory
also will not, apparently, stand the strain attempted to be put
upon it.
It is thought that this theory should be rejected, but an argu-
ment that the interest here created is not within the spirit, though
perhaps within the letter of the Rule, may be made. We may
30 The reason usually given is that stated in note E9, supra, namely, the
passing of an easement, but since the easement is assumed not to pass and not to
exist until long after the making of the covenant, it is difficult to see how on
theories (b) and (c) above noted there is privity.
31 See note x, supra.
32 London & S. W. Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 2o Ch. Div. 562 (1882); Lewis
Oyster Co. v. West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 Atl. 138 (1919) with comment in 29
YALE L. J. 87. See GRAY, RULE AGAiNST PRMEITIES, 3 ed., § 330. See Joseph
Warren, "The Progress of the Law - Estates and Future Interests," 34 HAv.
L. REV. 639, 642. Cf. 14 MiCH. L. REv. 231.
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start with an interesting suggestion made by Mr. Edwin H.
Abbot, Jr.,"3 and repeated by Professor G. E. Woodbine."4 Mr.
Abbot admits that options in gross are within the spirit of the
Rule, but argues that options appurtenant to other interests
such as leaseholds, are not, since they, unlike the former class
of options, encourage and do not discourage improvements
upon the land. Professor Woodbine repeats this argument, and
applies it to the positive option where the power is at all times
in the option holder, as distinguished from the negative option
of preemption, which simply gives the option holder the first
chance if the grantor decides to transfer. It is pointed out that
neither the option appurtenant nor the positive option suspends
the power of alienation of the interest, and it is argued that
they well might be considered as vested interests. It is ad-
mitted, however, that the authorities seem to be contra.3 5
A third theory has suggested itself to the writer, which, it is
submitted, meets the objections urged against the other theories.
It is in effect that the non-builder's title in the wall should not
be considered as one absolute interest which can only be ac-
quired at a single instant of time, but that realistically con-
sidered it is an aggregate of legal relations " of which certain
ones may pass at one and others at another time. It would
seem that the parties by their agreement contemplate that the
non-builder shall acquire his general interest in the party wall
- severalty title in part plus easements -immediately on the
execution of the contract, if the wall is already built, other-
wise immediately when it is built, but that he is restricted from
the exercise of an important privilege of enjoyment and user,
namely, the building on the wall and the using of it for support.
This, it is thought, is an interpretation which would appeal to
the parties themselves as sensible, whereas the others would not.
Would not the non-builder be surprised to be told that he has
no ownership in the wall until he pays the money? Would he
33 "Leases and the Rule against Perpetuities," 27 YALE L. J. 878.
34 See 29 YALE L. 7. 87.
35 Ibid. See also Edwin H. Abbot, Jr., "Covenants in a Lease Which Run
with the Land," 31 YALE L. J. 127, 135, 136.
36 For discussion of title in this view, see Walter W. Cook, "Hohfeld's
Contribution to the Science of Law," 28 YALE L. J. 721, 729, reprinted in
HoHnsaD, FUNDAMETAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIoNs, 3, 12.
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not be startled to learn that he, is not entitled to an injunction
restraining the builder from tearing down the wall? In fact
would he not probably succeed in getting the injunction if he
should ask for it? " It would seem a fairer interpretation to
say that both builder and non-builder own the wall as in normal
fashion, but that there is a restrictive agreement against a cer-
tain kind of use by the non-builder or his assigns until he or
his assigns shall make the required payment. The non-builder
may have such enjoyment of the wall-enclosure of his lot,
shade, and the like-as does not violate the restriction. The
situation is analogous to that of the restrictive agreement en-
forceable in equity, sometimes termed an "equitable easement"
or an " equitable servitude." " Such servitude in this case may
be terminated at any time by the payment to the builder or
his assigns of the stipulated amount.
This theory of the situation would avoid any difficulty of
"touching or concerning," for both sides of the agreement would
fill all requirements. As to the non-builder's part, the conclu-
sions previously stated concerning the money obligation apply,
and apply with all the more force since coupled with the burden
of payment is the privilege of user, a privilege of no value ex-
cept to the lot owner. As to the builder's part, upon receipt of
the agreed payment he loses a right that only he (or his assigns)
shall .use the wall. Since such right has obviously been of
special importance to him only in his capacity as lot owner, the
payment to him in return for the loss of the right touches or
concerns the land, under the test above stated."9
Is the Rule against Perpetuities violated? The answer upon
all the analogies which have occurred to the writer seems clearly
in the negative. The first analogy might be the well-settled rule
that a vested interest never offends the Rule even though posses-
sion cannot be taken until a period beyond that permitted by
the Rule.40 The Rule, therefore, apparently does not apply to
37 Cf. Knappenberger v. Fairchild, supra, note 16.
38 See Roscoe Pound, "The Progress of the Law, x918-i9i9 -Equity," 33
HIARV. L. REv. 813.
39 See note 6, supra.
40 Dodge v. Bennett, 21S Mass. 545, 102 N. E. 916 (1913); Salisbury v.
Salisbury, 92 Kan. 644, 141 Pac. 173 (1914). See GRAY, RurE AOAMnST PER-
PETUII Es, 3 ed., § 205.
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every legal relation in land, but only to those which rise to the
dignity of a recognized "interest," or "estate," or "title."
Restrictions on possession or user are too limited in extent to
come within it. Here we have a vested interest in the wall in
the non-builder, and only postponement of a certain degree of
possession.
Again, the restrictions here seem to come within the category
of restraints on enjoyment only, which are like restraints on
alienation and unlike perpetuities, and hence, as Professor Gray
so strenuously argued, do not come within the objections against
remoteness. Professor Gray, in dealing with the rule of Claflin
v. Claflin,4' which allowed the continuance of a trust for the
sole absolute interest of a beneficiary beyond his minority, states
that the beneficiary's interest may be considered vested, but
that another question then arises with which the Rule against
Perpetuities has nothing to do, viz.: Can the possession of a
vested interest be postponed?
He answers this question by saying that the Rule against
Perpetuities does not prevent such postponement, that it merely
settles the time within which interests must vest, and that when
once vested, they are all, present and future alike, subject to
the same restraints against alienation, with which the Rule has
nothing to do. And he asserts that the theory that the Rule
applies is "one more instance of the confusion wrought by con-
founding the Rule against Perpetuities with the rules against
restraints on alienation." 42 Professor Kales' views on this
point are in accord.48
It would then follow that the Rule against Perpetufties does
not apply and that the only objection which can be raised is
that the restriction is unreasonable. If objection on this latter
ground is sustained, it would mean not that no interest passed
to the non-builder, but that. the entire interest passed at once
and only the restriction is invalid. Consideration of this objec-
tion may be postponed until we have examined the final, and,
as it seems, the most appropriate analogy to our case in con-
nection with the Rule against Perpetuities, namely, the termina-
tion of an equitable restriction or servitude.
41 49 Mass. 1g, 20 N. E. 454 (1889).
42 GRAY, op. Cit., § 121f. 43 KtALs, FuTu.E INTMRESTS, 2 ed., § 658.
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It appears that the termination of an easement is not subject
to the Rule against Perpetuities. The law has always frowned
upon easements as incumbrances, and has permitted them to be
terminated by oral license acted upon or by abandonment by
the owner, even though perhaps the formalities of a deed might
seem called for.4" So the equitable servitude may be lost in
several ways, such as by laches in asking court aid, by viola-
tions by the owner thereof, or by changes in the condition of
the neighborhood. In fact every such servitude is treated as
though granted upon an implied limitation to last only so long
as the neighborhood remains substantially unchanged." The
law favors a return to the normal. Professor Gray says:
"As the Rule against Perpetuities affects the beginning only of
future interests, and does not concern itself with conditions subse-
quent, except so far as they are also conditions precedent, a provision
that an easement or other jus in alieno solo shall terminate on a cer-
tain contingency is not invalidated by the remoteness of the
contingency." 46
Here we have essentially an equitable servitude in favor of
the builder, which is subject to termination whenever the non-
builder chooses to pay the agreed amount. It seems clear that
the termination of the builder's restriction is one of the class of
transfers most favored in law and that it does not offend the
Rule against Perpetuities. And it is submitted, therefore, that
we may safely conclude that all objection based upon the Rule
is avoided upon the analysis here suggested.47
To turn now to the objection that the restriction must be
reasonable, we may note that the rule of policy seems especially
directed to the restraint on alienation, the clog on the power
of transfer of property interests.48 Only a comparatively few
44 For a brilliant though futile protest against the doctrine of abandonment
of easements, see ii COL. L. REv. 777.
45 See 34 HARv. L. REv. 786; 31 HARV. L. REv. 876.
46 GRAY, Op. Cit., § 279, citing Switzer v. Rochford [i9o6] i Ir. R. 399.
See also Hall v. Turner, xno N. C. 292, 14 S. E. 79, (1892).
4 See also GRAY, op. cit., § 33oa, to the effect that even though the right to
specific performance of a contract may not exist because of the rule, yet a
legal action on the contract still remains.
48 Thus Gray's researches dealt almost wholly with that phase of the ques-
tion. See GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON TnE ALIENATION or PROPERTY, 2 ed.
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cases seem to turn directly upon the reasonableness of a restric-
tion on the privilege of enjoyment, such as we have here, which
can hamper alienation in only a minor degree, if at all. Never-
theless, both the authorities and a justifiable policy seem to re-
quire that such a restriction must be reasonable in order to
be valid." As applied to the cases of equitable servitudes,
there is apparently no further statement of the rule than the
broad one that the restriction shall be reasonable and not offend
public policy. ° From the analogies of the more or less drastic
equitable servitudes which are currently upheld either for a
period or indefinitely, subject to the implied limitation of change
of neighborhood, we may safely conclude that the restriction
here under consideration is not in danger of being considered
unreasonable.5 A restriction that one shall not make a certain
beneficial use of an improvement on realty until one has paid
one's fair proportion of the cost or value of it would surely
appeal to a court as eminently fair and reasonable.
Here we may consider the special rule advocated by Professor
Kales as a measure of the reasonableness of the restraint on
alienation disclosed in the Claflin case. As the reader will recall,
Professor Gray argued that the interposition of a trust when
the beneficiary's interest was absolute was to be considered both
on policy and authority as an illegal restraint on alienation.52
Professor Kales denied this but did meet Gray's position to the
49 Pavkovich v. Southern Pac. R. Co., iso Cal. 39, 87 Pac. xo97 (x9o6);
Ruhland v. King, 154 Wis. 545, 143 N. W. 681 (1913). See A. W. Scott, "Con-
trol of Property by the Dead," 6S U. oF PA. L. REv. 632, 646.
so See Highland Realty Co. v. Groves, 130 Ky. 374, 377, 1i3 S. W. 420, 423
(x9o8). Such restrictions are upheld "when not repugnant to some plain pro-
vision of the law, and ... not unreasonable in themselves."
51 For examples, see notes 49 and So, supra, and see especially cases such
as Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 283 (1829), upholding a condition that
no window shall be placed in the north wall of a house for thirty years; and
Tobey v. Moore, 130 Mass. 448 (is8i), upholding perpetual restrictions that
no building conveyed to be used for certain trades should ever be erected upon
certain land, or within a certain distance of the street. See Am. Unitarian
Ass'n v. Minot, 185 Mass. 589, 595, 7z N. E. 551, 553 (19o4): "The duration
of an equitable restriction is a question of the intention of the parties to be
determined by construing the words used in the light of attending circum-
stances."
52 GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2 ed., §§ 1241-124p; GRAY, RuLE
AGAINST PERPErTTIES, 3 ed., §§ 121c-121iU.
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extent of agreeing that a perpetual trust of this character was
undesirable. He therefore suggested that the interposition of a
trust to last longer than a period equal to that adopted for the
application of the Rule against Perpetuities should be con-
sidered an unreasonable restraint, and hence that the bene-
ficiary might secure termination of the trust at any time." He
found authority for this view in English cases which had con-
fused the distinction urged by Professor Gray between objec-
tions based on remoteness and objections based upon restraint
of alienation. 4 This view has received the approval of text-
writers,55 and it seems desirable in the particular case to which
Professor Kales argued that it should be applied. Professor
Gray himself, although he continued to argue against the .rule
of the Claflin case, agreed that if it were to be adopted at all,
it should be restricted in some such manner as that suggested
by Professor Kales.5" There is, however, no authority for ap-
plying the rule to the ordinary equitable servitude which seems
to meet with general popular favor. Such a servitude fosters
improvements, and the more extended use and development of
realty. On the other hand, the interposition of a naked trust
between the beneficial owner and the subject-matter of his
property interest is the creation of an encumbrance of no con-
ceivable advantage to such owner or anyone connected with
him. It' does not even protect him from himself, for he may
sell his interest if he can find a purchaser to accept it so encum-
bered. 7 The only argument urged for it is that it carries out
the wishes of a person now dead - the former owner of the
property -who was presumably poorly advised, in view of the
useless character of the restriction. There is a strong argu-
ment of policy in limiting such a restriction, even if we are
unwilling to take the view of Professor Gray and of the English
53 KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2 ed., §§ 658, 659, 737. See also the follow-
ing discussions by the same author: "Vested Gifts to a Class and the Rule
against Perpetuities," I9 HARv. L. REv. 598; "Several Problems of Gray's Rule
against Perpetuities, Second Edition," 20 HARV. L. REv. 192; 4 ILL. L. REv. 281.
54 Cf. ibid. and In re Ridley, ii Ch. Div. 645 (1879).
55 See Joseph Warren,. "The Progress of the Law- Estates and Future
Interests," 34 HARV. L. REV. 639, 647, and authorities cited.
56 GRAY, RU'f AGAINST PERPETUITTES, 3 ed., § 121i.
57 De Ladson v. Crawford, 93 Conn. 402. xo6 Atl. 326 (2919).
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cases that it is improper in any event. Policy and authority,
however, neither require nor justify such treatment of the
equitable servitude.58 It is therefore believed that the party
wall restriction under consideration may safely pass all tests
of reasonableness.
As pointed out above, the modern cases sustain the running
of such covenants,59 and the conclusion of our argument is that
such holding not only is desirable from the standpoint of policy,
but is perfectly consistent with sound legal theory. Some states
have achieved the same result by statutes."° In a few jurisdic-
tions the situation still remains anomalous. The situation in
New York is sufficiently interesting to deserve special mention.
Since the New York statute against perpetuities is directed
only against the suspension of the power of alienation,61 it might
be thought that little objection would be found to these cove-
nants. Moreover, a liberal view of privity of estate was early
taken in New York." But, unfortunately, the court later be-
came confused on the matter of privity of estate," and ruled in
an unfortunately too well-known case, Cole v. Hughes," that a
party wall covenant must be considered as only personal. Such
a harsh and unnecessary ruling was bound to be limited, and in
a later case, Mott v. Oppenheimer,5 a party wall covenant was
i8 Possibly it may be desirable to limit the duration of all equitable re-
strictions to a stated number of years, as is done by the Massachusetts statute
referred to in Loud v. Pendergast, 206 Mass. 122, 92 N. E. 40 (igIo), but
that, it is submitted, is a question for the legislature.
59 This is admitted by the authorities cited in note x, supra. In addition
to the cases cited by Aigler, supra, and among the more recent cases are those in
note 29, supra, and Leek v. Meeks, ig Ala. 89, 74 So. 31 (i916); Hill v. City of
Huron, 33 S. D. 324, 145 N. W. 570 (1914), 39 S. D. 530, 165 N. W. 534 (X917);
Ellensburg Lodge No. 20, I.O.O.F. v. Collins, 68 Wash. 94, 122 Pac. 602 (1912) ;
Home v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 142 Ga. 489, 83 S. E. 204 (1914); Walker v.
Gish, 273 Fed. 366 (App. D. C., 1921). Cf. Hanson v. Beaulieu, 145 Minn.
19, 176 N. W. 178 (1920).
60 Younker v. McCutcheon, 177 Ia. 634, 159 N. W. 44i (1916). See Nathan
Isaacs, "Statutory Party Walls," 71 U. oF PA. L. REv. 229. As to the District of
Columbia regulations, see Fowler v. Koehler, 43 App. D. C. 349 (1915).
61 See GRAY, RUL3E AGAINST PEa a UIErls, 3 ed., § 748.
02 Van Rensselaer v. Hays, I9 N. Y. 68, 91 (3859).
63 See 32 YALE L. J. 123, 137, note 66; ibid., 141, note 82.
64 54 N. Y. 444 (1873). See a good statement of the unfortunate effect of
this case on the law generally in McCormick v. Stoneheart, supra, note 2.
65 X35 N. Y. 312, 3x N. E. 1o97 (1892).
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allowed to run. Other comparatively recent cases, refusing to
allow somewhat similar covenants to run, have called for the
making of careful distinctions between the cases.66 It seems
now to be considered the law that, if the parties contemplate the
immediate building of the wall and so state, the covenant will
run, but if the parties are providing for the building of the
wall, whenever it may be built, it does not. This seems to be
simply a rule of thumb to decide what the parties' intention may
be. It is unfortunate that it makes no attempt to ascertain or
carry out the actual intent of the parties. But if they will only
take pains to state that they contemplate that the wall shall
be built at once, their agreement then can be carried out.17
More recently still it has been laid down as the rule that
the burden of no covenant will be allowed to run with a fee in
New York, but among the rather numerous exceptions stated
to this rule is the case of party wall covenants. 8 The con-
fusion still remaining in that state is well illustrated by a case
decided last June, Logan v. United Interests, Inc.9
That case turned upon a covenant made in 1883 by A, the
owners of No. 6 Greene Street, New York, as parties of the
first part, B, who held title to No. 8 Greene Street as trustees
for L, parties of the second part, and L, the beneficiary, as
party of the third part. A, in putting up a new building, had
rebuilt and extended an old party wall, all of the extension
being made on A's own land at A's expense. The covenant was
in the form of a lease of this extension and provided that A
"do let and lease" to B, "their successors and assigns, the
said wall" "as and for the party wall" between the two build-
ings, so long as Number 8 should stand and require the use of
the same, "for the annual rent or sum of $326 to be paid to
them, the said parties of the first part, their heirs, executors,
administrators or assigns" in semi-annual payments, "which
rent the party of the third part for himself, his heirs and de-
visees of the said No. 8 Greene Street, hereby covenants and
66 Crawford v. Krollpfeiffer, 195 N. Y. 185, 88 N. E. 29 (igog); Sebald v.
Mulholland, i55 N. Y. 455, go N. E. 260 (1898)-
67 See Ralph W. Aigler, supra, io Micif. L. REv. x87. Cf. 69 CENT. L. J. 44.
68 Miller v. Clary, 21o N. Y. 127, IO3 N. E. 1114 (913).
69 236 N. Y. X94, 14o N. E. 240 (1923) per Judge Cardozo.
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agrees shall be paid at all times and in the way above specified
and does hereby irrevocably authorize and empower the parties
of the second part and their successors to pay the same" out
of income for his benefit, he further convenanting that "the
payment of the aforesaid rent" shall be deemed an application
of the amount thereof for his benefit under the terms of the
trust, to which the trustees consented and agreed. The agree-
ment further provided that A "for themselves, their heirs, exec-
utors, administrators and assigns" should keep the wall in
order and repair at their sole cost, and contained provisions
for the termination of the lease upon destruction of both build-
ings, and also upon the destruction of No. 8 unless the owners
thereof should desire otherwise; and also that upon the destruc-
tion of No. 6, the owners of either lot might have a "right to
terminate" on three months' notice.7" The owners of No. 8
then built upon the wall.' By mesne conveyances title to No. 6
came to the plaintiff. The interest of No. 8 was transferred by
deed given by the beneficiary of the trust and (apparently) by
the legal title-owners and in 1920 came to the defendants, since
which time no rent has been paid. In a suit for an installment
of the rent the municipal court gave judgment for the plaintiff
which was affirmed by the Appellate Term. The Appellate
Division, however, held that the agreement was a party wall
covenant and that, as such, it could not run.7 This is clearly
not in accord with the present New York rule, and was repudi-
ated by the Court of Appeals, but the latter court ruled that
the defendants were not liable on the ground that originally
only the beneficiary L was liable, and the defendants were not
in privity with him.
It is submitted that the decision is erroneous and that on two
different theories the defendants were liable: (i) as holders
of the land and successors to the trustees they were liable for
the rent; (2) as successors to the beneficiary they were liable
on the covenant to see that the rent was paid. On the first
ground, the court surely must be in error in saying that the
trustees were not liable for the rent. A perpetual rent is valid
70 Facts above stated not appearing in the opinion have been verified from
the record.
71 203 App. Div. 634, 197 N. Y. Supp. iog (1922).
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in New York, 2 and no technical words in a deed are necessary
to create a rent so long as the intention is clear. This the
court admits, and it cites authorities to illustrate the point""
but states that the context shows thit "the obligation of pay-
ment is assumed, not by the lessee, the fiduciary, the holder of
the title, but by someone else, the beneficiary." But with all
due respect, this is just what is not done. The beneficiary
covenants only that the rent shall be paid, and authorizes the
trustees to pay the same out of the income from the trust.
They and not he are to pay the rent. The wall is let to them
for a stated annual rent to be paid to the lessors. The trustees
were liable for the rent and the defendants as successors
thereto in the ownership of the land should now be liable
therefor."2
It is true that at common law a rent technically could not
issue out of an incorporeal interest such as an easement."'
That rule was closely connected with the limitations put upon
the remedy of distress and perhaps is no longer law." But even
if it is, the liability of the trustees and consequently of the
defendants is not altered. By leasing the wall the parties prob-
ably contemplated the transfer of a greater interest than an
easement; but if only an easement passed, the debt in return
therefor was analogous to rent and would be upheld upon simi-
lar principles. 8 The question here is not whether distress will
lie but whether the trustees assumed the obligation.
As to the other point, the defendants were in the direct line
of conveyance from the beneficiary and no reason appears why
they should not be bound by his covenant. The basis of the
72 Van Rensselaer v. Hays, supra, note 62; Van Rensselaer v. Read, supra,
note 27. See authorities collected in 28 C. 3. 839.
73 Attoe v. Hemmings, 2 Bulst. 281; Doe v. Kneller, 4 Car. & P. 3 (X829).
See GiLBERT, RENTS, 30, 38; 2 T1-.TANY, op. cit., 1469.
7 One of the authorities cited seems especially analogous. Bowe v. Hodges,
13 C. B. 765, 774 (1853): "rent to be paid."
75 Cowton v. Wickersham, 54 Pa. St. 302 (1867). See 2 TIFAy, op. cit.,
§ 414. See also 28 C. J. 86o.
76 Williams v. Hayward, i El. & El. io4o (i859). See GiLBERT, RENTS, 20-28.
77 2 TIFFANY, op. cit., § 405.
78 See ibid. See Jordan v. Indianapolis Water Co., i59 Ind. 337, 64 N. E.
68o (1902); Raby v. Reeves, 112 N. C. 688, i6 S. E. 76o (1893). See 2 CoL.
L. REv. 554.
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decision would seem to be that they cannot succeed to him
since he did not have the legal title. In order to find an equally
technical holding it would seem necessary to go back to Webb
v. Russell, 9 where it was held that a covenant made by a
mortgagor was made by a stranger to the land. Surely an
equitable title owner should not now be considered a stranger
to the land. It might be urged that inasmuch as the cestui
here purported to bind only his heirs and devisees, his assigns
are not bound. But it is not necessary to use the word assigns
in order that a covenant may run, if the intention is otherwise
clear."0 Since it is made very clear that the general arrange-
ment was intended to run, it would seem that this covenant also
should be held to run. A running covenant for the payment
of rent is upheld in New York."' The case seems one more
of the rather unfortunate line of New York cases on running
covenants.
The court suggests that the plaintiffs are not without remedies,
although no particular remedy was suggested. The Appellate
Division suggested, however, an action for use and occupation.
Apparently this was desired by the defendants, for it would
justify them in abandoning the wall and thus avoiding future
payments. It is difficult, however, to see how the defendant
may be liable for use and occupation if he is not legally obliged
to assume the burden of his predecessor in title. In England,
where running covenants in fees have been frowned upon by
the modern if not by the earlier law, an assignee of the prom-
isee has been able to recover against the original promisor for
use and occupation, on the theory that the defendant owes
someone."2 That case has been criticised,83 but it surely does
not justify action against another than the promisor. If the
covenant does not run the defendant has violated no duty and
assumed no obligation by remaining in possession. It is sub-
mitted that a sounder method of viewing such covenants is along
the line suggested in this article. Possibly the new English Law
79 3 T. R. 393 (i789).
80 See note S, supra.
81 See note 72, supra.
82 Irving v. Turnbull, [1goo] 2 Q. B. 129.
88 See 14 HARV. L. REv. 296; 1 COL. L. REV. 257.
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of Property Act may be held to work a reformation in this
direction, but it seems more probable that it will be considered
as but reaffirming the present rule on this subject."4
Charles E. Clark.
YALE LAW SCHOOL.
84 § 96 of the Law of Property Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. V, c. E6, provides
for the running of the benefits or burden of "covenants running with the land,"
and then states that, for the purposes of the section, a covenant runs "when
the benefit or burden of it, whether at law or in equity, passes to the successors
in title of the covenantee or the covenantor, as the case may be." Since it is
not stated when the benefit or burden will pass, we must probably look to the
previous law. Mr. Sims considers the section to have changed the law. See
Henry U. Sims, "Notes on Codifying Real Property Law in the United States,"
36 HARv. L. Rlv. 987, 996. But Underhill's view is apparently contrary. See
UNDEnRnLL, LAW Or PROPERTY Ac, 71. Other English commentators do not
cite this section as one changing the law. I am indebted to Professor Joseph
Warren for references on this point, and to an expression of opinion in accord
with the view here expressed.
